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Abstract. Protocols for information-hiding often use randomized primitives to
obfuscate the link between the observables and the information to be protected.
The degree of protection provided by a protocol can be expressed in terms of the
probability of error associated to the inference of the secret information.
We consider a probabilistic process calculus approach to the specification of such
protocols, and we study how the operators affect the probability of error. In par-
ticular, we characterize constructs that have the property of not decreasing the
degree of protection, and that can therefore be considered safe in the modular
construction of protocols.
As a case study, we apply these techniques to the Dining Cryptographers, and we
are able to derive a generalization of Chaum’s strong anonymity result.
1 Introduction
During the last decade, internet activities have become an important part of many peo-
ple’s lives. As the number of these activities increases, there is a growing amount of
personal information about the users that is stored in electronic form and that is usu-
ally transferred using public electronic means. This makes it feasible and often easy to
collect, transfer and process a huge amount of information about a person. As a conse-
quence, the need for mechanisms to protect the user’s privacy is compelling.
We can categorize privacy properties based on the nature of the hidden informa-
tion. Data protection usually refers to confidential data like the credit card number.
Anonymity, on the other hand, concerns the identity of the user who performed a cer-
tain action. Unlinkability refers to the link between the information and the user, and
unobservability regards the actions of a user.
Information-hiding protocols aim at ensuring a privacy property during an elec-
tronic transaction. For example, the voting protocol Foo 92 ([1]) allows a user to cast a
vote without revealing the link between the voter and the vote. The anonymity protocol
Crowds ([2]) allows a user to send a message on a public network without revealing the
identity of the sender. These kinds of protocols often use randomization to introduce
noise, thus limiting the inference power of a malicious observer.
1.1 Information theory
Recently it has been observed that at an abstract level information-hiding protocols can
be viewed as channels in the information-theoretic sense. A channel consists of a set of
⋆ This work has been partially supported by the INRIA DREI ´Equipe Associe´e PRINTEMPS
and by the INRIA ARC project ProNoBiS.
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input values S, a set of output valuesO (the observables) and a transition matrix which
gives the conditional probability p(o|s) of producing o as the output when s is the input.
In the case of privacy preserving protocols, S contains the secret information that we
want to protect and O the facts that the attacker can observe. This framework allows
us to apply concepts from information theory to reason about the knowledge that the
attacker can gain about the input by observing the output of the protocol.
In the field of information flow and non-interference there have been various works
[3–7] in which the high information and the low information are seen as the input and
output respectively of a (noisy) channel. Non-interference is formalized in this setting
as the converse of channel capacity.
Channel capacity has been also used in relation to anonymity in [8, 9]. These works
propose a method to create covert communication by means of non-perfect anonymity.
A related line of work is [10, 11], where the main idea is to express the lack of
(probabilistic) information in terms of entropy.
A different information-theoretic approach is taken in [12]. In this paper, the authors
define as information leakage the difference between the a priori accuracy of the guess
of the attacker, and the a posteriori one, after the attacker has made his observation. The
accuracy of the guess is defined as the Kullback-Leibler distance between the belief
(which is a weight attributed by the attacker to each input hypothesis) and the true
distribution on the hypotheses.
1.2 Hypothesis testing
In information-hiding systems the attacker finds himself in the following scenario: he
cannot directly detect the information of interest, namely the actual value of the random
variable S ∈ S, but he can discover the value of another random variable O ∈ O which
depends on S according to a known conditional distribution. The attempt to infer S
from O is called hypothesis testing (the “hypothesis” to be validated is the actual value
of S), and it has been widely investigated in statistics. One of the most used approaches
to this problem is the Bayesian method, which consists in assuming known the a priori
probability distribution of the hypotheses, and deriving from that (and from the matrix
of the conditional probabilities) the a posteriori distribution after a certain fact has been
observed. It is well known that the best strategy for the adversary is to apply the MAP
(Maximum Aposteriori Probability) criterion, which, as the name says, dictates that one
should choose the hypothesis with the maximum a posteriori probability for the given
observation. “Best” means that this strategy induces the smallest probability of error in
the guess of the hypothesis. The probability of error, in this case, is also called Bayes
risk. In [13], we proposed to define the degree of protection provided by a protocol as
the Bayes risk associated to the matrix.
A major problem with the Bayesian method is that the a priori distribution is not
always known. This is particularly true in security applications. In some cases, it may
be possible to approximate the a priori distribution by statistical inference, but in most
cases, especially when the input information changes over time, it may not. Thus other
methods need to be considered, which do not depend on the a priori distribution. One
such method is the one based on the so-called Maximum Likelihood criterion.
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1.3 Contribution
In this paper we consider both the scenario in which the input distribution is known, in
which case we consider the Bayes risk, and the one in which we have no information
on the input distribution, or it changes over time. In this second scenario, we consider
as degree of protection the probability of error associated to the Maximum Likelihood
rule, averaged on all possible input distributions. It turns out that such average is equal
to the value of the probability of error on the point of uniform distribution, which is
much easier to compute.
Next, we consider a probabilistic process algebra for the specification of information-
hiding protocols, and we investigate which constructs in the language can be used safely
in the sense that by applying them to a term, the degree of protection provided by the
term does not decrease. This provides a criterion to build specifications in a composi-
tional way, while preserving the degree of protection.
We apply these compositional methods to the example of the Dining Cryptogra-
phers, and we are able to strengthen the strong anonymity result by Chaum. Namely
we show that we can have strong anonymity even if some coins are unfair, provided
that there is a spanning tree of fair ones. This result is obtained by adding processes
representing coins to the specification and using the fact that this can be done with a
safe construct.
The proofs are omitted for lack of space. They can be found in the report ver-
sion of this paper, available on line at http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/
˜
catuscia/papers/Anonymity/Compositional/report.pdf.
1.4 Plan of the paper
In the next section we recall some basic notions. Section 3 introduces the language
CCSp. Section 4 shows how to model protocols and process terms as channels. Section
5 discusses hypothesis testing and presents some properties of the probability of error.
Section 6 characterizes the constructs of CCSp which are safe. Section 7 applies previ-
ous results to find a new property of the Dining Cryptographers. Section 8 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we recall some basic notions of probability theory and probabilistic au-
tomata ([14, 15]).
A discrete probability measure over a set X is a function µ : 2X 7→ [0, 1] such
that µ(X) = 1 and µ(∪iXi) =
∑
i µ(Xi) where Xi is a countable family of pairwise
disjoint subsets of X . We denote the set of all discrete probability measures over X
by Disc(X). For x ∈ X , we denote by δ(x) (the Dirac measure on x) the probability
measure that assigns probability 1 to {x}. If {ci}i are convex coefficients, and {µi}i
are probability measures, we will denote by
∑
i ciµi the probability measure defined as
(
∑
i ciµi)(Y ) =
∑
i ciµi(Y ).
A probabilistic automaton M is a tuple (St , Tinit ,Act , T ) where St is a set of
states, Tinit ∈ St is the initial state, Act is a set of actions and T ⊆ St × Act ×
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Disc(St) is a transition relation. Intuitively, if (T, a, µ) ∈ T then there is a transition
from the state T performing the action a and leading to a distribution µ over the states
of the automaton. (We use T for states because later in the paper states will be process
terms, and S will be used for certain sequences of actions). We also write T a−→ µ
if (T, a, µ) ∈ T . The idea is that the choice of transition among the available ones in
T is performed nondeterministically, and the choice of the target state among the ones
allowed by µ (i.e. those states T ′ such that µ(T ′) > 0) is performed probabilistically.
A probabilistic automaton M is fully probabilistic if from each state of M there is at
most one transition available.
An execution fragment φ of a probabilistic automaton is a (possibly infinite) se-
quence T0a1T1a2T2 . . . of alternating states and actions, such that for each i there is a
transition (Ti, ai+1, µi) ∈ T and µi(Ti+1) > 0. We will use fst(φ), lst(φ) to denote
the first and last state of a finite execution fragment φ respectively. An execution (or
history) is an execution fragment such that fst(φ) = Tinit . An execution φ is maximal
if it is infinite or there is no transition from lst(φ) in T . We denote by exec∗(M) the
set of all the finite non-maximal executions of M, and by exec(M) the set of all the
executions of M.
A scheduler of a probabilistic automatonM = (St , Tinit ,Act , T ) is a function
ζ : exec∗(M)→ T
such that ζ(φ) = (T, a, µ) ∈ T implies that T = lst(φ). The idea is that a scheduler
selects a transition among the ones available in T and it can base its decision on the
history of the execution. The execution tree of M relative to the scheduler ζ, denoted
by etree(M, ζ), is a fully probabilistic automatonM′ = (St ′, Tinit ,Act , T ′) such that
St ′ ⊆ exec(M), and (φ, a, µ′) ∈ T ′ if and only if ζ(φ) = (lst(φ), a, µ) for some µ,
and µ′(φaT ) = µ(T ). Intuitively, etree(M, ζ) is produced by unfolding the executions
of M and resolving all nondeterministic choices using ζ. Note that etree(M, ζ) is a
fully probabilistic automaton.
Given a fully probabilistic automaton M we can define a probability space on the
set exec(M) of executions of M (see [14] for more details). Similarly, given a prob-
abilistic automaton M and a scheduler ζ for M, we can define a probability space on
the set of traces of M by using the same construction on etree(M, ζ), which is a fully
probabilistic automaton.
3 CCS with internal probabilistic choice
We consider an extension of standard CCS ([16]) obtained by adding internal proba-
bilistic choice. The resulting calculus CCSp can be seen as a simplified version of the
probabilistic π-calculus presented in [17, 18] and it is similar to the one considered in
[19]. Like in those calculi, computations have both a probabilistic and a nondeterminis-
tic nature. The main conceptual novelty is a distinction between observable and secret
actions, introduced for the purpose of specifying information-hiding protocols.
We assume a countable set Act of actions a, and we assume that it is partitioned into
a set Sec of secret actions s, a set Obs of observable actions o, and the silent action τ .
For each s ∈ Sec we assume a complementary action s ∈ Sec such that s = s, and
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PROB
◦
P
i
pi Ti
τ
−→
P
i
pi δ(Ti)
ACT
j ∈ I
unionsqmultitext
Iai.Ti
aj
−→ δ(Tj)
PAR1
T1
a
−→ µ
T1 | T2
a
−→ µ | T2
PAR2
T2
a
−→ µ
T1 | T2
a
−→ T1 | µ
REP
T | !T
a
−→ µ
!T
a
−→ µ | !T
COM
T1
a
−→ δ(T ′1) T2
a
−→ δ(T ′2)
T1 | T2
τ
−→ δ(T ′1 | T
′
2)
RES
T
b
−→ µ φ 6= a, a
(νa)T
b
−→ (νa)µ
Table 1. The semantics of CCSp.
the same for Obs . The silent action τ does not have a complementary action, so the
notation a will imply that a ∈ Sec or a ∈ Obs .
The syntax of CCSp is the following:
T ::= process term
◦
∑
i pi Ti probabilistic choice
|
unionsqmultitext
i si.Ti secret choice (si ∈ Sec)
|
unionsqmultitext
i ri.Ti nondeterministic choice (ri ∈ Obs ∪ {τ})
| T | T parallel composition
| (νa)T restriction
| !T replication
All the summations in the syntax are finite. We will use the notation T1 ⊕p T2 to
represent a binary probabilistic choice ◦
∑
i pi Ti with p1 = p and p2 = 1− p. Similarly
we will use a1.T1
unionsqmultitext
a2.T2 to represent a binary secret or nondeterministic choice.
The semantics of a given CCSp term is a probabilistic automaton whose states are
process terms, whose initial state is the given term, and whose transitions are those
derivable from the rules in Table 1. We will use the notations (T, a, µ) and T a−→ µ
interchangeably. We denote by µ | T the measure µ′ such that µ′(T ′ | T ) = µ(T ′)
for all processes T ′ and µ′(T ′′) = 0 if T ′′ is not of the form T ′ | T , and similarly for
T | µ. Furthermore we denote by (νa)µ the measure µ′ such that µ′((νa)T ) = µ(T ),
and µ′(T ′) = 0 if T ′ is not of the form (νa)T .
Note that in the produced probabilistic automaton, all transitions to non-Dirac mea-
sures are silent. Note also that a probabilistic term generates exactly one (probabilistic)
transition.
A transition of the form T a−→ δ(T ′), i.e. a transition having for target a Dirac
measure, corresponds to a transition of a non-probabilistic automaton (a standard la-
5
beled transition system). Thus, all the rules of CCSp specialize to the ones of CCS
except from PROB. The latter models the internal probabilistic choice: a silent τ tran-
sition is available from the sum to a measure containing all of its operands, with the
corresponding probabilities.
A secret choice
unionsqmultitext
i si.Ti produces the same transitions as the nondeterministic termunionsqmultitext
i ri.Ti, except for the labels.
The distinction between the two kind of labels influences the notion of scheduler
for CCSp: the secret actions are assumed to be inputs of the system, so a secret choice
(with different guards) is determined by the input. The scheduler has to resolve only the
residual nondeterminism.
In the following, we use the notationX ⇀ Y to represent the partial functions from
X to Y , and φ|Sec represents the projection of φ on Sec.
Definition 1. Let T be a process in CCSp and M be the probabilistic automaton gen-
erated by T . A scheduler is a function ζ : Sec∗ → exec∗ ⇀ T such that:
(i) if s = s1s2 . . . sn and φ|Sec = s1s2 . . . sm with m ≤ n, and
(ii) there exists a transition (lst(φ), a, µ) such that, if a ∈ Sec then a = sm+1
then ζ(s)(φ) is defined, and it is one of such transitions. We will write ζs(φ) for ζ(s)(φ).
Note that this definition of scheduler is different from the one used in probabilis-
tic automaton, where the scheduler can decide to stop, even if a transition is allowed.
Here the scheduler must proceed whenever a transition is allowed (provided that if it is
labeled by a secret, that secret is the next one in the input string s).
We now adapt the definition of execution tree from the notion found in probabilistic
automata. In our case, the execution tree depends not only on the scheduler, but also on
the input.
Definition 2. Let M = (St , T,Act , T ) be the probabilistic automaton generated by a
CCSp process T , where St is the set of processes reachable from T . Given an input s
and a scheduler ζ, the execution tree of T for s and ζ, denoted by etree(T, s, ζ), is a
fully probabilistic automaton M′ = (St ′, T,Act, T ′) such that St ′ ⊆ exec(M), and
(φ, a, µ′) ∈ T ′ if and only if ζs(φ) = (lst(φ), a, µ) for some µ, and µ′(φaT ) = µ(T ).
4 Modeling protocols for information-hiding
We propose here an abstract model for information-hiding protocols, and we show how
to represent this model in CCSp. An extended example is presented in Section 7.
4.1 Protocols as channels
We view protocols as channels in the information-theoretic sense [20]. The secret in-
formation that the protocol is trying to conceal constitutes the input of the channel, and
the observables constitute the outputs. The set of the possible inputs and that of the
possible outputs will be denoted by S and O respectively. We assume that S and O are
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of finite cardinality m and n respectively. We also assume a discrete probability distri-
bution over the inputs, which we will denote by ~π = (πs1 , πs2 , . . . , πsm), where πs is
the probability of the input s.
To fit the model of the channel, we assume that at each run, the protocol is given
exactly one secret si to conceal. This is not a restriction, because the si’s can be complex
information like sequences of keys or tuples of individual data. During the run, the
protocol may use randomized operations to increase the level of uncertainty about the
secrets and obfuscate the link with the observables. It may also have internal interactions
between internal components, or other forms of nondeterministic behavior, but let us
rule out this possibility for the moment, and consider a purely probabilistic protocol.
We also assume there is exactly one output from each run of the protocol, and again,
this is not a restrictive assumption because the elements of O can be structured data.
Given an input s, a run of the protocol will produce each o ∈ O with a certain
probability p(o|s) which depends on s and on the randomized operations performed
by the protocol. Note that p(o|s) depends only on the probability distributions on the
mechanisms of the protocol, and not on the input distribution. The probabilities p(o|s),
for s ∈ S and o ∈ O, constitute a m × n array M which is called the matrix of the
channel, where the rows are indexed by the elements of S and the columns are indexed
by the elements of O. We will use the notation (S,O,M) to represent the channel.
Note that the input distribution ~π and the probabilities p(o|s) determine a distribu-
tion on the output. We will represent by p(o) the probability of o ∈ O. Thus both the
input and the output can be considered random variables. We will denote these random
variables by S and O.
If the protocol contains some forms of nondeterminism, like internal components
giving rise to different interleaving and interactions, then the behavior of the protocol,
and in particular the output, will depend on the scheduling policy. We can reduce this
case to previous (purely probabilistic) scenario by assuming a scheduler ζ which re-
solves the nondeterminism entirely. Of course, the conditional probabilities, and there-
fore the matrix, will depend on ζ, too. We will express this dependency by using the
notation Mζ .
4.2 Process terms as channels
A given CCSp term T can be regarded as a protocol in which the input is constituted
by sequences of secret actions, and the output by sequences of observable actions. We
assume that only a finite set of such sequences is relevant. This is certainly true if the
term is terminating, which is usually the case in security protocols where each session
is supposed to terminate in finite time.
Thus the set S could be, for example, the set of all sequences of secret actions up
to a certain length (for example, the maximal length of executions) and analogously O
could be the set of all sequences of observable actions up to a certain length. To be more
general, we will just assume S ⊆fin Sec∗ and O ⊆fin Obs∗.
Definition 3. Given a term T and a scheduler ζ : S → exec∗ → T , the matrix Mζ(T )
associated to T under ζ is defined as the matrix such that, for each s ∈ S and o ∈ O,
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p(o|s) is the probability of the set of the maximal executions in etree(T, s, ζ) whose
projection in Obs is o.
5 Inferring the secrets from the observables
In this section we discuss possible methods by which an adversary can try to infer the
secrets from the observables, and consider the corresponding probability of error, that is,
the probability that the adversary draws the wrong conclusion. We regard the probability
of error as a representative of the degree of protection provided by the protocol, and we
study its properties with respect to the associated matrix.
We start by defining the notion of decision function, which represents the guess the
adversary makes about the secrets, for each observable. This is a well-known concept,
particularly in the field of hypothesis testing, where the purpose is to try to discover the
valid hypothesis from the observed facts, knowing the probabilistic relation between
the possible hypotheses and their consequences. In our scenario, the hypotheses are the
secrets.
Definition 4. A decision function for a channel (S,O,M) is any function f : O → S.
Given a channel (S,O,M), an input distribution ~π, and a decision function f ,
the probability of error P(f,M,~π) is the average probability of guessing the wrong
hypothesis by using f , weighted on the probability of the observable (see for instance
[20]). The probability that, given o, s is the wrong hypothesis is 1−p(s|o) (with a slight
abuse of notation, we use p(·|·) to represent also the probability of the input given the
output). Hence we have:
Definition 5 (Probability of error, [20]). P(f,M,~π) = 1−∑O p(o)p(f(o)|o)
Given a channel (S,O,M), the best decision function that the adversary can use,
namely the one that minimizes the probability of error, is the one associated to the
so-called MAP rule, which prescribes choosing the hypothesis s which has Maximum
Aposteriori Probability (for a given o ∈ O), namely the s for which p(s|o) is maximum.
The fact that the MAP rule represent the ‘best bet’ of the adversary is rather intuitive,
and well known in the literature. We refer to [20] for a formal proof.
The MAP rule is used in the so-called Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing, and
the corresponding probability of error is also known as Bayes risk. We will denote it
by PMAP(M,~π). The following characterization is an immediate consequence of Defi-
nition 5 and of the Bayes theorem p(s|o) = p(o|s)πs/p(o).
PMAP(M,~π) = 1−
∑
O
max
s
(p(o|s)πs)
It is natural then to define the degree of protection associated to a process term as the
infimum probability of error that we can obtain from this term under every compatible
scheduler (in a given class).
In the following, we assume the class of schedulersA to be the set of all the sched-
ulers compatible with the given input S.
It turns out that the infimum probability of error on A is actually a minimum:
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Proposition 1. For every CCSp process T we have
inf
ζ∈A
PMAP(Mζ(T ), ~π) = min
ζ∈A
PMAP(Mζ(T ), ~π)
Thanks to previous proposition, we can define the degree of protection provided by
a protocols in terms of the minimum probability of error.
Definition 6. Given a CCSp process T , the protection PtMAP(T ) provided by T , in the
Bayesian approach, is given by
PtMAP(T, ~π) = min
ζ∈A
PMAP(Mζ(T ), ~π)
The problem with the MAP rule is that it assumes that the input distribution is
known to the adversary. This is often not the case, so it is natural to try to approximate
it with some other rule. One such rule is the so-called ML rule, which prescribes the
choice of the s which has Maximum Likelihood (for a given o ∈ O), namely the s for
which p(o|s) is maximum. The name comes from the fact that p(o|s) is called the likeli-
hood of s given o. We will denote the corresponding probability of error by PML(M,~π).
The following characterization is an immediate consequence of Definition 5 and of the
Bayes Theorem.
PML(M,~π) = 1−
∑
O
max
s
(p(o|s))πs
It has been shown (see for instance [21]) that under certain conditions on the matrix,
the ML rule approximates indeed the MAP rule, in the sense that by repeating the
protocol the adversary can make the probability of error arbitrarily close to 0, with
either rule.
We could now define the degree of protection provided by a term T under the ML
rule as the minimumPML(Mζ(T ), ~π), but it does not seem reasonable to give a definition
that depends on the input distribution, since the main reason to apply a non-Bayesian
approach is that indeed we do not know the input distribution. Instead, we define the
degree of protection associated to a process term as the average probability of error
with respect to all possible distributions ~π:
Definition 7. Given a CCSp process T , the protection PtML(T ) provided by T , in the
Maximum Likelihood approach, is given by
PtML(T ) = min
ζ∈A
(m− 1)!
∫
~π
PML(Mζ(T ), ~π) d~π
In the above definition, (m − 1)! represents a normalization function: 1(m−1)! is the
hyper-volume of the domain of all possible distributions ~π on S, namely the (m − 1)-
dimensional space of points ~π such that 0 ≤ πs ≤ 1 and 0 ≤
∑
s∈S πs = 1 (where m
is the cardinality of S).
Fortunately, it turns out that this definition is equivalent to a much simpler one: the
average value of the probability of error, under the Maximum Likelihood rule, can be
obtained simply by computing PML on the uniform distribution ~πu = ( 1m ,
1
m
, . . . , 1
m
).
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Theorem 1.
PtML(T ) = min
ζ∈A
PML(Mζ(T ), ~πu)
The next corollary follows immediately from Theorem 1 and from the definitions
of PMAP and PML.
Corollary 1.
PtML(T ) = min
ζ∈A
PMAP(Mζ(T ), ~πu)
We conclude this section with some properties of PMAP . Note that the same proper-
ties hold also forPML on the uniform distribution, becausePML(M,~πu) = PMAP(M,~πu).
The next proposition shows that the probabilities of error are concave functions with
respect to the space of matrices.
Proposition 2. Consider a family of channels {(S,O,Mi)}i∈I , and a family {ci}i∈I
of convex coefficients, namely 0 ≤ ci ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I , and
∑
i∈I ci = 1. Then:
PMAP(
∑
i∈I
ciMi, ~π) ≥
∑
i∈I
ci PMAP(Mi, ~π)
Corollary 2. Consider a family of channels {(S,O,Mi)}i∈I , and a family {ci}i∈I of
convex coefficients. Then:
PMAP(
∑
i∈I
ciMi, ~π) ≥ min
i∈I
PMAP(Mi, ~π)
The next proposition shows that if we transform the observables, and collapse the
columns corresponding to observables which have become the same after the transfor-
mation, the probability of error does not decrease.
Proposition 3. Consider a channel (S,O,M), where M has conditional probabilities
p(o|s), and a transformation of the observables f : O → O′. Let M ′ be the matrix
whose conditional probabilities are p′(o′|s) =
∑
f(o)=o′ p(o|s) and consider the new
channel (S,O′,M ′). Then:
PMAP(M
′, ~π) ≥ PMAP(M,~π)
The following propositions are from the literature.
Proposition 4 ([21]). Given S, O, let M be a matrix indexed on S, O such that all the
rows of M are equal, namely p(o|s) = p(o|s′) for all o ∈ O, s, s′ ∈ S. Then,
PMAP(M,~π) = 1−max
s
πs
FurthermorePMAP(M,~π) is the maximum probability of error, i.e. for every other matrix
M ′ indexed on S, O we have:
PMAP(M,~π) ≥ PMAP(M
′, ~π)
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Proposition 5 ([22]). Given a channel (S,O,M), the rows of M are equal (and hence
the probability of error is maximum) if and only if p(s|o) = πs for all s ∈ S, o ∈ O.
The condition p(s|o) = πs means that the observation does not give any additional
information concerning the hypothesis. In other words, the a posteriori probability of
s coincides with its a priori probability. The property p(s|o) = πs for all s ∈ S and
o ∈ O was used as a definition of (strong) anonymity by Chaum [23] and was called
conditional anonymity by Halpern and O’Neill [24].
6 Safe constructs
In this section we investigate constructs of the language CCSp which are safe with
respect to the protection of the secrets.
We start by giving some conditions that will allow us to ensure the safety of the
parallel and the restriction operators.
Definition 8. Consider process terms T1, T2, and observables o1, o2, . . . , ok such that
(i) T1 does not contain any secret action, and
(ii) the observable actions of T1 are included in o1, o2, . . . , ok.
Then we say that T1 and o1, o2, . . . , ok are safe with respect to T2.
The following theorem states our main results for PtMAP . Note that they are also
valid for PtML, because PtML(T ) = PtMAP(T, ~πu).
Theorem 2. The probabilistic choice, the nondeterministic choice, and a restricted
form of parallel composition are safe constructs, namely, for every input probability
π, and any terms T1, T2, . . . , Th, we have
(1) PtMAP( ⊙
∑
i
pi Ti, ~π) ≥
∑
i
pi PtMAP(Ti, ~π) ≥ min
i
PtMAP(Ti, ~π)
(2) PtMAP(
unionsqmultidisplay
i
oi.Ti, ~π) = min
i
PtMAP(Ti, ~π)
(3) PtMAP((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 | T2)) ≥ PtMAP(T2, ~π)
if T1 and o1, o2, . . . , ok are safe w.r.t. T2
Unfortunately the safety property does not hold for the secret choice. The following
is a counterexample.
Example 1. Let Sec = {s1, s2} and assume that S does not contain the empty se-
quence. Let T = o1.0
unionsqmultitext
o2.0. Then PtMAP(T, ~π) is maximum (i.e. PtMAP(T, ~π) =
1 − max~π) because for every sequence s ∈ S we have p(o1|s) = p(o2|s). Let
T ′ = s1.T
unionsqmultitext
s2.T . We can now define a scheduler such that, if the secret starts
with s1, it selects o1, and if the secret starts with s2, it selects o2. Hence, under this
scheduler, p(o1|s1s) = p(o2|s2s) = 1 while p(o1|s2s) = p(o2|s1s) = 0. Therefore
PtMAP(T
′, ~π) = 1 − p1 − p2 where p1 and p2 are the maximum probabilities of the
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secrets of the form s1s and s2s, respectively. Note now that either max~π = p1 or
max~π = p2 because of the assumption that S does not contain the empty sequence.
Let ~π be such that both p1 and p2 are positive. Then 1 − p1 − p2 < 1 −max~π, hence
PtMAP(T
′, ~π) < PtMAP(T, ~π).
The reason why we need the condition (i) in Definition 8 for the parallel operator is
analogous to the case of secret choice. The following is a counterexample.
Example 2. Let Sec and S be as in Example 1. Define T1 = s1.0
unionsqmultitext
s2.0 and T2 =
o1.0
unionsqmultitext
o2.0. Clearly, PtMAP(T2, ~π) = 1 −max~π. Consider now the term T1 | T2 and
define a scheduler that first executes an action s in T1 and then, if s is s1, it selects o1,
while if s is s2, it selects o2. The rest proceeds like in Example 1, where T ′ = T1 | T2
and T = T 2.
The reason why we need the condition (ii) in Definition 8 is that without it the
parallel operator may create different interleavings, thus increasing the possibility of an
adversary discovering the secrets. The following is a counterexample.
Example 3. Let Sec andS be as in Example 1. Define T1 = o.0 and T2 = s1.(o1.0 ⊕.5
o2.0)
unionsqmultitext
s2.(o1.0 ⊕.5 o2.0). It is easy to see that PtMAP(T2, ~π) = 1 − max~π.
Consider the term T1 | T2 and define a scheduler that first executes an action s in
T2 and then, if s is s1, it selects first T1 and then the continuation of T2, while if
s is s2, it selects first the continuation of T2 and then T1. Hence, under this sched-
uler, p(oo1|s1s) = p(oo2|s1s) = .5 and also p(o1o|s2s) = p(o2o|s2s) = .5 while
p(oo1|s2s) = p(oo2|s2s) = 0 and p(o1o|s1s) = p(o2o|s1s) = 0. Therefore we have
that PtMAP(T, ~π) = 1 − p1 − p2 where p1 and p2 are the maximum probabilities of
the secrets of the form s1s and s2s, respectively. Following the same reasoning as in
example 1, we have that for certain ~π, PtMAP(T ′, ~π) < PtMAP(T, ~π).
7 A case study: the Dining Cryptographers
In this section we consider the Dining Cryptographers (DC) protocol proposed by
Chaum in [23], we show how to describe it in CCSp, and we apply the results of previ-
ous section to obtain a generalization of Chaum’s strong anonymity result.
In its most general formulation, the DC consists of a multigraph where one of the
nodes (cryptographers) may be secretly designated to pay for the dinner. The cryp-
tographers would like to find out whether there is a payer or not, but without either
discovering the identity of the payer, nor revealing it to an external observer. The prob-
lem can be solved as follows: we put on each edge a probabilistic coin, which can give
either 0 or 1. The coins get tossed, and each cryptographer computes the binary sum of
all (the results of) the adjacent coins. Furthermore, it adds 1 if it is designated to be the
payer. Finally, all the cryptographers declare their result.
It is easy to see that this protocol solves the problem of figuring out the existence of
a payer: the binary sum of all declarations is 1 if and only if there is a payer, because
all the coins get counted twice, so their contribution to the total sum is 0.
The property we are interested in, however, is the anonymity of the system. Chaum
proved that the DC is strongly anonymous if all the coins are fair, i.e. they give 0 and 1
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Crypt i = ci,i1(x1) . . . . . ci,ik (xk) . pay i(x) . d¯i〈x1 + . . .+ xk + x〉
Coinh = c¯ℓ,h〈0〉 . c¯r,h〈0〉.0 ⊕ph c¯ℓ,h〈1〉 . c¯r,h〈1〉.0
Collect = d1(y1) . d2(y2) . . . . . dn(yn) . out〈y1, y2, . . . , yn〉
DC = (ν~c)(ν ~d)(
Q
i
Crypt i |
Q
h
Coinh | Collect)
Table 2. The dining cryptographers protocol expressed in CCSp.
with equal probability, and the multigraph is connected, namely there is a path between
each pair of nodes. To state formally the property, let us denote by s the secret identity
of the payer, and by o the collection of the declarations of the cryptographers.
Theorem 3 ([23]). If the multigraph is connected, and the coins are fair, then DC is
strongly anonymous, namely for every s and o, p(s|o) = πs holds.
We are now going to show how to express the DC in CCSp. We start by introducing
a notation for value-passing in CCSp, following standard lines.
Input c(x).T =
unionsqmultitext
v cv.T [v/x]
Output c¯〈v〉 = c¯v
The protocol can be described as the parallel composition of the cryptographers
processes Crypt i, of the coin processes Coinh, and of a process Collect whose purpose
is to collect all the declarations of the cryptographers, and output them in the form of
a tuple. See Table 2. In this protocol, the secret actions are pay i. All the others are
observable actions.
Each coin communicates with two cryptographers. ci,h represents the communica-
tion channel between Coinh and Crypt i if h is indeed the index of a coin, otherwise
it represents a communication channel “with the environment”. We will call the latter
external. In the original definition of the DC there are no external channels, we have
added them to prove a generalization of Chaum’s result. They could be interpreted as a
way for the environment to influence the computation of the cryptographers and hence
test the system, for the purpose of discovering the secret.
We are now ready to state our generalization of Chaum’s result.
Theorem 4. A DC is strongly anonymous if it has a spanning tree consisting of fair
coins only.
Proof. Consider the term DC in Table 2. Remove all the coins that do not belong to the
spanning tree, and the corresponding restriction operators. Let T be the process term
obtained this way. Let A be the class of schedulers which select the value 0 for all the
external channels. This situation corresponds to the original formulation of Chaum and
so we can apply Chaum’s result (Theorem 3) and Proposition 5 to conclude that all
the rows of the matrix M are the same and hence, by Proposition 4, PMAP(M,~π) =
1−maxi πi.
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Consider now one of the removed coins, h, and assume, without loss of generality,
that cℓ,h(x), cr,h(x) are the first actions in the definitions of Crypt ℓ and Crypt r. Con-
sider the class of schedulers B that selects value 1 for x in these actions. The matrix
M ′ that we obtain is isomorphic to M : the only difference is that each column o is
now mapped to a column o + w, where w is a tuple that has 1 in the ℓ and r positions,
and 0 in all other positions, and + represents the componentwise binary sum. Since
this map is a bijection, we can apply Proposition 3 in both directions and derive that
PMAP(M
′, ~π) = 1−maxi πi.
We can conclude, therefore, that PtMAP(T, ~π) = 1−maxi πi in the class of sched-
ulers A ∪ B.
By repeating the same reasoning on each of the removed coins, we can conclude
that PtMAP(T, ~π) = 1−maxi πi for any scheduler ζ of T .
Consider now the term T ′ = (νcℓ,hcr,h)(Coinh | T ) obtained from T by adding
back the coin h. By applying Theorem 2 we can deduce that PtMAP(T ′, ~π) ≥ PtMAP(T, ~π).
By repeating this reasoning, we can add back all the coins, one by one, and obtain the
original DC . Hence we can conclude that PtMAP(DC , ~π) ≥ PtMAP(T, ~π) = 1−maxi πi
and, since PtMAP(T, ~π) is maximum, we have PtMAP(DC , ~π) = 1 − maxi πi, which
concludes the proof.
Interestingly, also the other direction of Theorem 4 holds. We report this result for
completeness, however we have proved it by using traditional methods, not by applying
the compositional methods of Section 6.
Theorem 5. A DC is strongly anonymous only if it has a spanning tree consisting of
fair coins only.
8 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we have investigated the properties of the probability of error associated
to a given information-hiding protocol, and we have investigated CCSpconstructs that
are safe, i.e. that are guaranteed not to decrease the protection of the protocol. Then we
have applied these results to strengthen a result of Chaum: the dining cryptographers
are strongly anonymous if and only if they have a spanning tree of fair coins.
In the future, we would like to extend our results to other constructs of the language.
This is not possible in the present setting, as the examples after Theorem 2 show. The
problem is related to the scheduler: the standard notion of scheduler is too powerful
and can leak secrets, by depending on the secret choices that have been made in the
past. All the examples after Theorem 2 are based on this kind of problem. In [25], we
have studied the problem and we came out with a language-based solution to restrict
the power of the scheduler. We are planning to investigate whether such approach could
be exploited here to guarantee the safety of more constructs.
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